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**FOREIGN  
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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Arms Control**

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# Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-88-013

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19 APRIL 1988

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**USSR Said 'Pessimistic' on START Treaty Prospects**

OW021417 Beijing XINHUA in English  
1348 GMT 2 Apr 88

["Moscow Publication Pessimistic on New U.S.-Soviet Accord"—XINHUA Headline]

[Text] Moscow, April 2 (XINHUA)—The Kremlin says it is finding it difficult to work out a draft accord on a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive arms before U.S. President Ronald Reagan visits Moscow in late May.

Until late last month, Moscow had been optimistic about a draft treaty, but a commentary in the weekly newspaper "NEW TIMES" yesterday said that many difficulties remain to be worked out before the next superpower summit.

The article said that although both the Soviet Union and the United States need a good accord without misunderstandings, double explanations and without harm to their own security, this second treaty would inevitably be more complicated than the intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) treaty signed by Gorbachev and Reagan in Washington late last year.

Struggles between factions favoring and opposed to the accord are increasingly sharpening within the Reagan administration, the article said.

Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Information Department, told a press conference this week that it is better to delay an accord than to hurry forward a bad one.

**PEOPLE'S DAILY Sees U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Treaty 'In Trouble'**

OW081649 Beijing XINHUA in English  
1618 GMT 8 Apr 88

["People's Daily: U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Arms Treaty in Trouble"—XINHUA Headline]

[Text] Beijing, April 8 (XINHUA)—No substantial progress has been made over the past month in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on reducing 50 percent of their strategic nuclear arms as both sides stuck to their original positions, thus dimming the prospects of such a treaty at the planned Moscow summit in late May.

This came in a commentary of the PEOPLE'S DAILY today entitled "U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Arms Treaty in Trouble".

The paper says that the major dispute is still over space weapons, stemming from the Reagan-proposed "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) program. In spite of some compromises worked out at the U.S.-Soviet summit last December, the two countries are still deeply split over the issue.

The Soviet side calls for strict observance of an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in its original form which was signed between the two countries in 1972, while the United States argues that the treaty allows the research, development and experiment of strategic defense systems. The paper also says the Soviet side demands that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the agreement to observe the ABM Treaty be signed and enter into force simultaneously, while the United States wants them concluded separately.

Such a difference showed as soon as the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks got under way in Geneva last January, with the Soviet side tabling a draft "Soviet-U.S. Protocol on Reducing and Limiting Offensive Strategic Weapons," which also urged strict observance by both sides of the ABM Treaty, and a ban on experiments of weapons in outer space as the prerequisite to the reduction of strategic arms.

The U.S. side saw this as another Soviet attempt to link nuclear arms reduction with the U.S. SDI program, and countered it with a draft "Treaty on Defense and Space Systems" which allows the research, development and experiment of strategic defense technology by both sides. It also held that this treaty and the strategic arms reduction treaty be signed separately. Foreign ministers of the two countries failed to iron out the difference during their meetings in February and March.

What comes next, the paper says, is a dispute on the contents of a strategic arms reduction treaty. Although the two sides agreed on the total amount of the strategic weapons to be cut, problems remain as to how to carry out cuts actually and how to set the quotas for the different types and different quantities of the strategic weapons they possess.

During U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz' visit to Moscow in February, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev came up with a fresh idea for cutting various types of strategic weapons, which drew no response from the U.S. side.

Another sticking point in the U.S.-Soviet talks, the paper says, is over mobile continental missiles and sea-borne long-range cruise missiles. The U.S. side urges a ban on such missiles, which form a vital component part of the Soviet nuclear armory, due to difficult verification, while the Soviet Union demands limitations be imposed on the number of sea-borne cruise missiles which gives the U.S. the edge over the Soviet Union.

Verification is another problem, the paper says. It was agreed between the U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers during their February meeting that their delegations to the Geneva arms control talks will work out three protocols on verification as appendices to a nuclear reduction treaty within a month. But there are many blanks yet to be filled in the three documents.

There are also political considerations standing in the way of an early nuclear arms cutting treaty, the paper says. True, it is out of their common need to work towards reducing half of their strategic arsenals, and the signing of such a treaty is possible, in view of their ongoing strategy adjustments, economic performance at home, and the changes taking place in their relations. But each side has its own considerations as to when and under what circumstances the strategic arms reduction treaty should be concluded and signed.

The PEOPLE'S DAILY says that recent statements by the two superpowers show that the Soviet Union is more anxious to sign the strategic arms accord in Moscow, thus making the Moscow summit a "new and epoch-making event in a bid to arrest the nuclear arms race." The United States, however, is seen as not in such a hurry in order to wrest a better treaty. It seems that the Reagan administration is slowing the pace purposely in order not to give the impression that it is also in a hurry and not to invite trouble for his Republican Party in an election year. It is also said that the United States may have come to the conclusion that, aware of the Soviet Union's anxiety to sign the treaty, the U.S. is making gestures designed to wrest more concessions.

Nevertheless, the commentary concludes, both the United States and the Soviet Union see the planned summit as another important ring [as received] in continuing their dialogue, and, in a period to come, they will continue their disputes and negotiations at the same time while making preparations for the Moscow summit.

#### Problems in Reaching U.S.-Soviet START Treaty Viewed

##### RENMIN RIBAO Commentary

HK081236 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese  
8 Apr 88 p 6

["Commentary" by Fang Min: "Difficult Conclusion to the Nuclear Treaty and Current U.S.-Soviet Relations"—first paragraph published in boldface]

[Text] Over the past month or so, some changes that afford food for thought have taken place in U.S.-Soviet relations about the question of cutting strategic arms by 50 percent, which may possibly cause difficulties in concluding the treaty on reducing strategic arms. The treaty may not be signed at the Moscow summit meeting between the two countries. The crux of the problem is that both sides still cannot solve their great differences on some major questions, especially the question of space arms caused by the U.S. SDI. There are also some other factors affecting the drafting of the treaty. Reducing strategic arms by 50 percent is a common demand by both the United States and the Soviet Union. In the period to come, dialogue will continue to be an important aspect of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Over the past month or so both the United States and the Soviet Union have said that the strategic arms reduction treaty may not be signed at the summit meeting between the two countries, which will be held in the first half of the year. President Reagan said first in an interview with WASHINGTON POST reporters during the last days of February that the strategic arms treaty is much more complicated than the treaty on intermediate-range guided missiles, and it is impossible to have the treaty draft finished before his meeting with Gorbachev since the time is limited. One month later, in a commentary in the Soviet NEW TIMES, published at the beginning of April, the previous Soviet optimistic attitude toward the signing of the treaty had changed. It also held that there existed many difficulties in drafting the treaty before Reagan's visit to the Soviet Union at the end of May. In the days as the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting approaches, the change in the original remarks by the two countries indicate a new trend in current U.S.-Soviet relations, which provides food for thought.

Signing a treaty on reducing strategic arms by 50 percent at the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in the first half of this year was originally a common objective for Reagan and Gorbachev, decided on by them through consultation last December. At that time they were fully aware of the complexity of the drafting work, but were optimistic of signing this treaty within 6 months, which would make the Moscow meeting a new milestone in nuclear disarmament. Now, both sides have changed their tunes. People would like to ask: What is the status quo of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear talks, and why have things become difficult in concluding the strategic arms reduction treaty.

The question of strategic arms reduction has been an important part of U.S.-Soviet arms control since 1985. Over the past 3 years or so, through difficult talks and three summit meetings, much headway has been made by both sides on the question of strategic arms. It can be said that a general frame for reducing strategic arms has basically been formed. The basic point is that both sides have agreed to cut 50 percent of their strategic arms, reduce the numbers of their strategic vehicles and warheads to 1,600 and 6,000, and limit the number of warheads of both ground-based and sea-based guided missiles to 4,900. At the same time, both sides have also agreed to work out detailed regulations on checking the implementation of the strategic arms treaty on the basis of the measures agreed for checking implementation of the treaty on intermediate-range guided missiles. Now the talks have come to a deadlock. The crux is that both sides have held to their original stands and no substantial headway has ever been made on some of the outstanding questions.

The first question is the relationship between observing the anti-missile treaty and strategic arms reduction. This is the most difficult problem in U.S.-Soviet contention. In essence it is a sharp contradiction concerning the question of arms in space which has been caused by



Reagan's SDI. At the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting last December both sides made certain compromises on this question. The viewpoints of both sides were stated in their communique, but in reality there is still a great gap between their basic stands. The Soviet Union requires that the anti-missile treaty signed by the two countries in 1972 should be strictly observed, but the United States emphasizes that the treaty allows the study, development, and trials for the strategic defense system. The Soviet Union requires that agreements are reached at the same time on the signing of the treaty on strategic arms reduction and on observing the anti-missile treaty, which will also become effective at the same time, but the United States stands for signing the two agreements separately. These differences were soon revealed at the U.S.-Soviet Geneva talks on arms control in January this year. During the talks the Soviet Union put forward a draft of the "Protocol of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on Reducing and Restricting Offensive Strategic Arms," requiring both sides to strictly observe the anti-missile treaty and not to carry out experiments on outer space defense arms. It also made this regulation a necessary prerequisite for reducing strategic arms. The United States held that this was another attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to link reductions in nuclear arms with restrictions on the U.S. SDI program. It also put forward a draft "Treaty on Defense and Space Systems," in which it was stipulated that both parties may study, develop, and experiment with strategic defense technology. It proposed that this treaty should be separated from the strategic arms treaty and signed separately. The dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union on this issue was still unresolved at the two meetings between the two foreign ministers last February and March. The deadlock has not been broken.

The second is about the contents of the strategic arms treaty. The total quantities of strategic arms to be cut by both parties have been fixed. However, because they possess different types of nuclear arms in different quantities, the question of how to specifically cut the arms and how to define ceilings for various types of arms is still very complicated. When Shultz visited the Soviet Union last February, Gorbachev reportedly put forward in concrete terms a new proposal for reducing various types of strategic arms. The details of the proposal have not been made public and the United States has not made any direct reply. Moreover, both parties also disagree on the question of mobile intercontinental missiles and sea-based long-range cruise missiles. Mobile intercontinental missiles constitute an important component part of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The United States favors banning them on the grounds that the number of such missiles is difficult to verify. It maintains that they should be banned unless a reliable method of verification can be found. On the other hand, the United States occupies a dominant position in sea-based long-range cruise missiles. This kind of missile can be loaded with both nuclear and conventional warheads.

The Soviets maintain that the treaty should include restrictions on these but the United States is opposed to any restrictions on their quantities.

Verification is also a knotty problem. During their meeting last February, the U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers decided to allow their delegations to the Geneva Talks to work out in 1 month, three protocols concerning verification, which would be taken as appendices to the treaty and which would provide detailed verification procedures, methods for destroying missiles or transforming nuclear submarines and bombers for other purposes, as well as exchanging data and information for verification. However, the drafts of the three documents worked out so far have left many blank spots and unsettled contents.

In addition to these main outstanding issues some other political factors have more or less obstructed the progress of the talks and the drafting of the treaty. True, judged from various factors, such as the U.S. and Soviet strategic readjustments, their domestic economic conditions, and changes in their relationship, the United States and the Soviet Union have a common need to reduce strategic arms by 50 percent. Although great differences remain, it is still possible for them to reach an agreement. However, both parties seem to have different considerations on the question of when and under what circumstances they will finish their talks and sign a strategic arms reduction treaty. Judging from the recent remarks by the superpowers, it is generally held that the Soviet Union seems to be more eager to sign a strategic arms reduction treaty in Moscow so that the U.S.-Soviet Moscow summit can become "a new epoch-making event in the efforts to restrict the nuclear arms race." However, as analyzed by some people abroad, the U.S. Government stresses the need "to seek a good treaty" and so is not in a hurry to sign. To avoid giving people the impression of being impatient for success and thus creating trouble for the Republican Party in an election year, the Reagan administration seems to have intentionally slowed the pace. As some people see it, perhaps believing that the Soviets are impatient for an agreement the United States has deliberately struck a pose to win more concessions. In any case, both the United States and the Soviet Union still regard the next summit as an important link to develop the dialogue. In the days to come the United States and the Soviet Union will probably engage in debates while continuously discussing the treaty and making the necessary preparations for the summit meeting.

#### Rowny Comment Cited

OW062214 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0927 GMT 6 Apr 88

[Text] Washington, April 5 (XINHUA)—U.S. Presidential Arms Control Adviser Edward Rowny said that the United States will not abandon its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), in exchange for an agreement with the Soviet Union on strategic arms reduction.

"We would like to see reductions in strategic offensive arms and progress in strategic defenses as well. The two objectives are both good ones and are complementary," Rowny said in a prepared speech released here today.

Rowny accused the Soviet Union of trying to hold a strategic arms agreement hostage to an insistence that the SDI, known as the "Star Wars" program, be crippled.

"We should not allow the Soviets to force us to choose between them," Rowny said.

Rowny said that it would be desirable for U.S. and Soviet leaders to sign the treaty when they meet in Moscow in late May. But, he stressed that the United States has "set no deadlines."

He said the United States would not agree to a "vague formulation," with which the Soviets insist that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty restrict SDI work.

#### **Gromyko Said Pessimistic About START Agreement Prospects**

*OW090832 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0240 GMT 9 Apr 88*

[Text] Moscow, April 8 (XINHUA)—Soviet President Andrey Gromyko today expressed pessimism about the Geneva talks on reducing strategic offensive nuclear arms, saying the talks are not going "smoothly."

Meeting with a delegation from the Foreign Policy and Constitution Committee of the Norwegian Storting (Parliament), Gromyko said: "The Geneva talks for limiting strategic offensive arms are not proceeding smoothly, although common approaches to some issues have been identified."

According to the official Soviet news agency TASS, Gromyko repeated the Soviet stand for "reaching agreement and signing a new treaty (on cutting strategic nuclear weapons)," but adding that it is hard to foresee the results of the talks.

Gromyko hoped Norway to make contribution of its own to the disarmament process. [sentence as received]

The Norwegian delegation spoke of the Soviet advantage over the United States in conventional arms in Europe, TASS said.

Gromyko said it is better to "speak of symmetry of armed forces," but also pointed out that the United States has an edge over the Soviet Union in other fields.

"In some categories of arms it is in favor of the Soviet Union, and in others in U.S. favor," he added.

## NEW ZEALAND

### USSR Drops Condition on Adherence to South Pacific NFZ Treaty

52001063 Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD  
in English 6 Feb 88 p 9

["Soviets To Observe Nuclear Free Zone." Passage in boldface as published]

[Text] Wellington Staff—The Soviet Union has dropped a condition covering its ratification of the South Pacific nuclear-free treaty which previously left it "free of commitments" if faced with the presence of a nuclear-armed ship in the region.

Having signed the protocols to the treaty in December 1986, the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet last week ratified them to make the nuclear-free zone "more viable."

A counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Wellington, Mr Valeriy Bobounov, yesterday said the Soviet Union had originally included the condition covering other nuclear-armed ships and aircraft to expose the treaty's "weak points."

#### 'Loose'

That had now been withdrawn with the Soviet Union accepting the treaty as a whole.

However, the treaty was still "loose" on its allowance of nuclear warships transiting through the zone.

The Soviet Union had given an undertaking that none of its ships would carry nuclear arms within the zone, he added.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Marshall, warmly welcomed the Soviet move to ratify the treaty protocols. However, further comment would await formal filing of the terms of ratification with the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation in Suva.

#### Storage

The protocols cover undertakings not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosives against parties to the treaty and not to test nuclear explosives within the nuclear-free zone.

The treaty's first protocol—banning the manufacture and storage of nuclear devices—is open to signing by nuclear weapon states with territories in the region.

Those nations—the United States, Britain and France—have yet to sign the treaty protocols.

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## BULGARIA

### Polish Foreign Minister on Disarmament Issues

AU051609 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in  
Bulgarian 1 Apr 88 p 6

[Statement by Marian Orzechowski, Poland's minister of foreign affairs, given to Boyko Vutov and Petur Gornenski, "representatives of the RABOTNICHESKO DELO Editorial Board": "With United Efforts Toward Realistic Goals"—date not given]

[Text] The conviction that the INF Treaty created a beneficial climate for significant progress in reducing the arsenals of weapons and creating guarantees of the peoples' safe existence, is the premise on which we base our position on the issues of disarmament and international security. We must not waste this opportunity. Thus, the positive processes marked by the treaty could obtain a steady and irreversible character.

In the forum of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Warsaw Pact member states, which took place in Sofia, we discussed the practical implementation of this task and the possibility of making a joint contribution in this respect. As you know, at the session we adopted an Appeal to the NATO Member States and All Countries Participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In this appeal we outlined the most important directions of the activity in disarmament, and called for the unification of efforts for achieving goals, which in our opinion are realistic.

The process of conventional disarmament in Europe has a primary importance for Poland and all other European countries. We adhere to quickly completing the work on the mandate of the talks on this matter, and activating this forum already during the current year.

We hope that these talks take place in a businesslike atmosphere and will quickly produce the first significant results. With the other allied countries, we are working in this direction on the concept of the talks.

The balance of the conventional forces is attached to many myths. I specifically mean the Western thesis about an alleged superiority of the Warsaw Pact member states. It would be beneficial to purge this concept of the balance from such myths before the talks start, and base the talks on verified tasks. Therefore, our countries propose to conduct an open exchange of statistical data related to the conventional potential of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

Poland's activity on issues of disarmament and security has a long-lasting tradition and specific characteristics. This activity is based on the philosophy of universal and equal security for all. It is this philosophy, based on our experience, that has produced the Jaruzelski Plan, whose goal is to reduce arms and increase confidence in central

Europe, which is an especially dangerous region of our continent. We shall further develop our initiative and include it in the joint activity of the socialist countries in the area of disarmament.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Editorial Urges Central European CW-Free Zone

AU081925 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech  
7 Apr 88 p 1

[Editorial: "Chemical Weapons Out of Central Europe"]

[Text] The interdependence of the contemporary world requires constant orientation toward creating long-term, stable, and guaranteed security on individual continents as well as throughout the world. It requires security which respects the interests of every member of the international community, and which proceeds from the requirement to radically limit and subsequently destroy mass destruction weapons and substantially reduce conventional weapons. Therefore the international public rightly demands that one of the first steps in the disarmament process should be the ban on chemical weapons, which is being discussed in Geneva. Every year it seems that the talks will be concluded with a treaty, yet this has not happened so far. In recent months it even seems as if one of the main negotiators—the United States—has lost interest in finding an early and positive conclusion in Geneva. And this despite the fact that the members of the Warsaw Pact, as well as the majority of the members of the North Atlantic pact, are in favor of the ban.

In this situation the CPCZ, the SED, and the SPD have come forward with their joint declaration (published Wednesday), the contents of which is the proposal that the governments of the CSSR, the GDR, and the FRG begin, without delay, talks on the elimination, or non-stationing, of chemical weapons on their territories, and the appeal addressed to the rest of the states of Europe to join this initiative and thus acquire the right to control this zone free of chemical weapons.

Beginning such talks would benefit the participants as well as all of Europe. This idea corresponds to the current international policy development. After all, consultations between the CSSR, GDR, and FRG delegations have been going on in Geneva for several months now.

Thus far the FRG Government has rejected the idea of the zone, claiming that one has to give preference to efforts for a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. However, in Bonn, too, they know that the Geneva talks on chemical weapons are dragging because of the fault of the United States, and that a breakthrough must be achieved.

Therefore it is difficult to understand that in such a situation an FRG Ministry of Defense representative described the participation of the SPD in the effort for



the zone free of chemical weapons as "falling in the allies' back," and as a step "which will make the Geneva talks more difficult." From the FRG there resound voices saying that it is, allegedly, unheard of for a big Western opposition party to join forces with "ruling parties of communist countries" for a common purpose.

The CPCZ, the SED, and the SPD submitted their project for a zone free of chemical weapons for the first time on 19 June 1985. They also submitted variants of verification. The West, including Bonn, rejected the idea. The arguments then were the same as today, although much has happened since then. The disarmament process in the form of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-range Missiles has been initiated. In Czechoslovakia there were and are no chemical weapons, and now also no nuclear devices, which were withdrawn from the CSSR earlier, before the spring. In February, our country submitted a proposal to create a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the line separating the Warsaw Pact and NATO. A Soviet-American agreement is being prepared on reducing strategic offensive weapons to half, and on the table lies the Sofia appeal of the session of the Warsaw Pact ministers of foreign affairs on reducing military confrontation from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The world is changing and international relations are acquiring new qualities. Old clichés are being demolished, trite stereotypes of an "enemy picture" are losing their effectiveness. More and more people are aware of the benefit of new thinking on the international scene in the nuclear age. But the reaction of some forces in the West to disarmament initiatives of the East often conform to the past. Nor are, obviously, some politicians in the FRG, together with bourgeois information media, willing to reconsider their stands and thinking. Otherwise they would limit their caring to narrow party interests and would understand that the Social Democrats' signing of the Joint Declaration of Tuesday, 5 April, is not a "betrayal of the FRG interests."

The West German public demanded years ago that the United States withdraw from the FRG thousands of tons of chemical weapons. And it was not only the communists, but also social democrats, liberals, trade unionists, and Christians who demanded this. And how did the United States respond? By announcing new chemical weapons which, allegedly, will not be that dangerous. The United States has already started producing binary chemical weapons, and they are, according to American generals, destined for the European battlefield! Are, perhaps, these weapons less dangerous only because their two components react only after being fired? On the contrary, they are even more dangerous because they create an illusion of safety, the impression that everything is in order, feeling that one has to "intimidate" the East.

In its press review on Wednesday morning, the West German Deutschlandfunk radio station tried to give the impression that the SPD would be completely alone in its opinion in the FRG. It published only voices warning the SPD against "embarking onto thin ice," against "making pacts with Communists," against the danger of goodwill being "misused for propaganda" by the socialist states! There is no need to go back in time very far—similar voices resounded from the same papers and radios before the Soviet-American treaty and before the withdrawal of Soviet shorter-range missiles from the CSSR and the GDR. And, at the same time, the FRG Ministry of Defense as well as the Chancellor's Office repeat ad infinitum Chancellor Kohl's words that the FRG wants peace with the smallest possible quantity of weapons. Is this supposed to mean that what is involved is the quantity of weapons on one side only?

The CPCZ and the SED on the one hand, and the SPD on the other, are political organizations of different character. But all three of them are active in the region with the largest accumulation of weapons—in central Europe. After long talks they have come to the conclusion that the threat of destruction in case of war is great for all of them, and that it has to be averted, that one must not sit with one's hands folded in one's lap. Not for the reason of collecting public opinion "points," not because they would like to delay a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, but because they want to break the ice, they are coming forward with an urgent proposal to begin talks on the elimination, or nonstationing, of chemical weapons on the territory of the CSSR, the GDR, and the FRG. This also would be an opportunity to gain experience with various kinds of verifications, including short inspections. This would improve even more the atmosphere in central Europe and would serve as an example for other regions. Czechoslovakia and the GDR are ready for this and expect the FRG Government to ponder over their goodwill again.

#### **Government Ready for Immediate Regional CW Talks**

*LD081241 Prague CTK in English 1135 GMT 8 Apr 88*

[Text] Prague April 8 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak Government is ready to immediately start talks with the governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on the liquidation and non-deployment of chemical weapons on the three countries' territories as it was proposed in the joint statement of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the GDR's Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the West German Social Democratic Party of April 5.

The Czechoslovak Government welcomes the willingness of the GDR Government to join these talks, Czechoslovak Government spokesman Miroslav Pavel told CTK today.

**Regional Talks on CW Nondeployment Urged**  
*LD121238 Prague CTK in English*  
*1201 GMT 12 Apr 88*

[Text] Prague April 12 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Spokesman Dusan Rovensky made a statement concerning Czechoslovakia's standpoint on some international developments at a press conference here today.

Referring to a joint declaration of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the GDR's Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) of April 5, calling for an immediate opening of talks on nondeployment of chemical weapons on the territories of the three states, Rovensky said Czechoslovakia is prepared to start such talks at any time and at any level. He said that long delays in working out a convention on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons and on their liquidation, the starting of chemical weapons production in the USA and problems with their effective control "corroborate our opinion that the proposal of Czechoslovakia and the GDR to create a chemical weapons-free zone in Europe was well-founded and is not in the least losing its urgency".

The implementation of this proposal would help solve the so far open questions of a worldwide convention and would be a major step forward in globally banning chemical weapons.

Speaking about the 6th round of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna, due to start in the coming days, Dusan Rovensky said Czechoslovakia was interested in a fruitful outcome of the talks as the fifth round brought no fundamental turn and positive processes, witnessed in international relations, were not reflected in its course to the required extent.

He said the NATO states were obviously unwilling to pursue the path of new approaches in the international dialogue and carried on attempts to assert their one-sided views. In the sixth round of the Vienna CSCE meeting, the Czechoslovak delegation will seek an effective, constructive dialogue, in close cooperation with the other socialist states, the spokesman said.

He also pointed out that Czechoslovakia welcomed the fact that after the complicated period of indirect talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan a system of agreements that would make possible a comprehensive settlement of the situation around Afghanistan is ready for signing. In this context he emphasized the importance of Soviet initiatives in particular Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of February 8, 1988 and the conclusions of the Tashkent meeting with Afghan President Najibullah of April 7.

**GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC**

**SED-CPCZ-SPD Present Joint Declaration on CW Talks**

*LD061605 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1333 GMT 6 Apr 88*

[Text] Geneva, 6 Apr ADN—The ambassadors of the GDR and the CSSR at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, Dr Harald Rose and Milos Vejvoda, Wednesday presented the joint declaration of the SED, the CPCZ, and the SPD on a chemical weapons ban to Ambassador David Meiszter, president of the 40-state body, and Ambassador Bogumil Sujka, chairman of the Committee for Chemical Weapons.

The ambassadors took the opportunity to stress that considerable progress had indeed been achieved in negotiations on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, but that since last autumn considerable problems had arisen. In view of this situation, the parties supported their governments' appeal to the participants in the disarmament conference to continue their work in a constructive spirit and to remove all obstacles.

The ambassadors stressed that the joint initiative of the three parties for the creation of a chemical weapons-free zone is aimed at achieving a worldwide ban on these weapons as soon as possible.

**Foreign Ministry Spokesman: GDR Ready for 'Immediate' CW Talks**

*LD071652 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1432 GMT 7 Apr 88*

[Text] Berlin, 7 Apr (ADN)—The GDR Government, in accordance with the joint statement by the SED, CPCZ, and SPD, is ready to enter into immediate talks with the Governments of the CSSR and the FRG on freeing the territory of the three states, or else keeping them free, of chemical weapons. This was stated in Berlin today by Ambassador Wolfgang Meyer, spokesman for the GDR Foreign Ministry.

Europe must be freed from chemical weapons as quickly as possible, he stressed. In view of the considerable difficulties in the negotiations at the Geneva Disarmament Conference on a global ban on chemical weapons, the proposal to create such a zone in central Europe without delay and in so doing implement ahead of schedule the parts of the treaty already agreed at the Geneva Disarmament Conference on shunning these weapons worldwide, and particularly on controlling them, is of great importance for European security. In the GDR's view, it is intended to settle some still outstanding questions of a global convention by gaining practical experience.

The spokesman noted that the GDR has already done much in the past to promote a ban on these weapons of mass destruction. In 1986, the document entitled "Principles and Main Directions of Negotiations Between the GDR, CSSR, and FRG on creating a zone in central Europe free of chemical weapons" was presented as a basis for talks to the Governments of the FRG, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and Luxembourg. In his letter to Federal Chancellor Kohl on 14 December 1987, Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, mentioned yet again the problem of chemical weapons and urged a review of the FRG's position with regard to a zone free of chemical weapons. The visit to a chemical plant by the participants of the Pugwash Seminar in the GDR in March 1987, which served to discuss practical controls on the spot, once again demonstrated the GDR's readiness to accelerate the conclusion of a ban on chemical weapons.

In conclusion, the spokesman gave his assurance that the GDR will continue to make every effort to achieve a comprehensive and complete ban on chemical weapons and to support every constructive step in this direction.

#### **FRG's Woerner's Plans To 'Replace' INF Missiles Criticized**

*AU111546 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 8 Apr 88 p 2*

[**"HE,"** commentary: "Harassing Fire Against Disarmament"]

[Text] A few days ago we published the appeal by the Warsaw Pact member states to the NATO states and all countries participating in the CSCE. It contained new proposals for disarmament that include all types of weapons and all kinds of verification measures. As the **BONNER GENERALANZEIGER** reported, the FRG welcomed the proposals from the East, their factual nature, and the "readiness to cooperate in the sphere of arms control."

In this connection, one immediately recalls the constructive contribution that the FRG Government made to bringing about the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles. And one recalls Chancellor Kohl's repeatedly expressed view that in his opinion there is no need to decide on "modernizing" tactical missiles.

Now, exactly at the time when this positive reaction to our appeal came from Bonn, the FRG press carries puzzling reports according to which NATO is preparing a new missile program. "The chancellor and his foreign minister are still opposed to this idea, but in the Defense Ministry the preliminary work for a new round of the arms race has already been started." Defense Minister Woerner had a secret study prepared which states that "in the long run nuclear weapons are indispensable" and must be modernized. And what is more: "New rockets,

cruise missiles, and aircraft bombs have been completely drafted, tests are already being carried out, and some of them are already being delivered." They are to be "aimed at targets that have so far been covered by the Pershing II and land-based cruise missiles, which have now been released for scrapping." The new nuclear weapons could be fired at the GDR, CSSR, and Poland.

In other words: Woerner's ministry does not only want to modernize tactical nuclear weapons, which was rejected by Chancellor Kohl, but it also wants to replace the intermediate-range nuclear missiles that are to be eliminated according to the Washington treaty.

The only thing that remains to be said is that a group of military officers that is linked with the armament lobby still dreams of military superiority. They are trying to thwart what has been achieved through the introduction of disarmament. Thus, it again becomes clear that disarmament is not automatically accepted but that it requires great efforts, consistency, and struggle.

#### **Western Lack of 'New Thinking' Criticized**

*DW130700 East Berlin Domestic Service in German 1712 GMT 11 Apr 88*

[Guenter Leuschner's weekly foreign policy review]

[Excerpts] Only rarely have words found their place in political terminology so rapidly as have perestroika and new thinking. Those who use the words in the West usually assume that such processes are merely socialist matters.

Last week **FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU** said: The West has yet to have its perestroika in the military sector. That is at least some realization, to say nothing of concession. It is likely that the biggest shortage of new thinking is NATO's, in the disarmament sector. Following the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from the GDR and the CSSR ahead of schedule, it was announced this morning that the Soviet Union has also destroyed the first six of its intermediate-range missiles—way ahead of schedule. Such active forward movement is really quite pleasant compared to the hesitant approach of the other parties involved in the disarmament process. One might argue that nobody is obliged to implement treaties ahead of schedule. But whether the active or the hesitant approach is involved, each demonstrates a certain mental attitude.

How about chemical weapons? The new proposal from the SED, CPCZ, and SPD comes at a time when action by central Europeans on their own is particularly necessary. The West is publicly discussing that this year there will probably be no international ban on chemical weapons in the Geneva negotiations because of U.S. and French obstructionist policies. At the same time FRG politicians almost daily are suggesting bans on such chemical weapons. That seems to be a credible concern, especially because the barrels containing the chemical



war material are so much subject to corrosion that a catastrophe can no longer be ruled out in the FRG where there are chemical weapons depots. So why not take the bull by the horns—negotiate with each other according to the three parties' proposal so as to at least solve the problem here where the two blocs face each other? Maybe I am wrong, but many official reactions from Bonn sound as if there were a will, but not enough courage to find a way.

What reasons can there be? Maybe the Americans or somebody in France would not like the FRG to talk hot issues with us. There was a remark in a television commentary that it is in line with the Western security system that no member nation should pursue a policy of its own. That provides some explanation. It refers, moreover, primarily to the relationship between sovereignty and the leadership structure of NATO. However, the crucial point must probably be sought somewhere else.

The FRG Government itself has a strange aversion to discussing common security issues jointly with its neighbors and to solving them when possible. That same problem exists when it comes to nuclear weapons. Lately Foreign Minister Genscher again explained that a discussion over new or modernized short-range weapons is not desired. What would be more obvious than negotiating with us over a nuclear-weapons-free zone in central Europe? Of course, all such things would be new and such negotiations would certainly show that here and there we all live in the same European house and that we are—at least regarding peace and security—objective partners. To confess that partnership would affect the way we dealt with each other—is it from that many people shrink?

#### NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on Soviet SRINF Missile Destruction

LD131040 East Berlin ADN International Service in  
German 0126 GMT 13 Apr 88

[Text] Berlin, 13 Apr (ADN)—"NEUES DEUTSCHLAND" today publishes a commentary on the detonation of the first Soviet SS-20 SRINF missiles that were withdrawn from the GDR and the CSSR. Referring to the early withdrawal of the OTR-22 missiles, the handing over of these missiles' former base to the GDR's trade unions' holiday service, and now the missiles' detonation the paper writes: "The whole chain of this close succession of steps once more shows that we seriously mean disarmament. We are contributing constructively to the implementation of the INF agreement as soon as possible. Global tribute has been paid to our unilateral prior concession as a gesture of goodwill; as an honest, confidence-building measure; and as an example the other side should follow."

Above all we are demonstrating our wish that disarmament should now advance swiftly. The halving of the USSR's and the United States's strategic offensive weapons should now follow the destruction of the intermediate-range missiles. Disarmament should be extended to all other armaments, conventional weapons, too. The Warsaw Pact states put forward a comprehensive program on this in Sofia that does not avoid any type of weapon or any issue of verification.

The GDR will use all its strength and influence toward such a progression of events. On Erich Honecker's initiative the great international meeting for nuclear weapon-free zones will take place from 20-22 June in Berlin.



## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

### Akhromeyev Seen as 'Key Figure' in Soviet Arms Control Policy

1826002 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 8 Dec 87 p 2

[Article by Werner Adam]

[Text] Washington, 7 Dec—If a medal were to be awarded during the signing today of the agreement to eliminate U. S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles, it would primarily be deserved by a man who always stays in the background but even so counts as one of the most important supporters of General Secretary Gorbachev: Marshal Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff and first deputy defense minister of the Soviet Union. Not least among his admirers are those U. S. disarmament experts who have learned to appreciate this "thinker in a soldier's coat," first at the so-called intermediate summit in Reykjavik and then during the decisive final negotiations before the present meeting between his party chief and President Reagan in Washington, as an equally knowledgeable and affable counterpart. When this Soviet marshal of rather short stature appears in uniform, the projecting officer's cap almost seems to overwhelm him. Much as he apparently tends to prefer an inconspicuous civilian suit, however, Akhromeyev is a master of his profession and does not allow himself to be impressed either by talkative politicians or by smart diplomats.

These and similar opinions of him can be heard from nearly all American experts who have had anything to do with him so far. When other Soviet negotiating partners start to babble propaganda, Akhromeyev usually quite abruptly cuts them short. And when Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at the most recent pre-summit round in Washington still appeared indecisive regarding the harsh U. S. demands for a "watertight inspection regime," it is said that the aforementioned marshal, after hesitating for a long time, finally stepped in and signalled his corresponding agreement. It is hardly surprising that Akhromeyev is counted as part of the entourage of the man in the Kremlin. On the one hand, Gorbachev and Reagan now want to attack the much more difficult 50 percent reduction in their strategic arms arsenals, and on the other the Soviet general secretary has apparently become caught in a situation at home in which it is necessary to have the protection of the military. For this, however, Akhromeyev should be the right man, inasmuch as, after the new defense minister, he is practically the second man in the hierarchy of the Soviet armed forces and also possesses the most precise knowledge of those questions and problems which have arisen for both superpowers out of their tug-of-war about arms control.

Thus, in September 1984, which was 6 months before Gorbachev took office, this marshal had been promoted to chief of the General Staff under circumstances which to this day remain obscure. At that time, when ailing party chief Chernenko still formally set the tone in the

Kremlin, Marshal Ogarkov all of a sudden found himself replaced as chief of the General Staff and first deputy defense minister but did not fall into disgrace. Not long ago, on his 70th birthday, he even received a high distinction. Regardless of such curiosities, the call for Akhromeyev to succeed Ogarkov at the time caused no surprise. On the contrary, after the previous career of the now 64 year-old marshal, it seemed quite logical. Western military people who had met him so far uniformly described Akhromeyev as a man who knew how to curb his temperament—he is said to be the son of a Tatar—and is capable of sharp thinking and rapid formulation of his words, scarcely less self-confident than his predecessor in the office.

Born in an unknown location in Russia on 5 May 1923, Akhromeyev began his soldier's career in 1940 and, according to official description, took an "active part in the Great Patriotic War." In the rather scanty biographical notes it can further be read that as early as 1942, he completed the Frunze naval officers school in Leningrad and 10 years later began to study at the Moscow Malinovsky Armored Troops Military Academy. Akhromeyev thus became and remained a pronounced tank man: first as commander of a tank regiment, then as commander in chief of a tank division and finally as major general of the armored troops. Having been chief of staff of the Far East Military District in the meantime, he began his actual career at the Moscow command center in the mid-seventies with an appointment as chief of a main administration of the Defense Ministry. Still under General Secretary Andropov, his promotion to marshal followed in 1983; in that same year this gained him admission as a full member of the Central Committee of the party. But, having become chief of the General Staff in 1984, and one of the three first deputies of the Defense Ministry, why did he not take the final leap, so to speak, when Gorbachev last summer fired Defense Minister Sokolov in anger over the "Kremlin flight" by a German amateur pilot? The speculation is obvious that to the general secretary who preaches nuclear disarmament Akhromeyev was more important in his role as chief military adviser than as head of the Soviet Defense Ministry. In any case, this marshal with the watchful eyes behind rimless glasses unquestionably ranks as one of the key figures of that which Gorbachev and Reagan will sign this Tuesday in Washington and celebrate as a "historical event."

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### Inspector General Views INF Treaty, Conventional Balance

DW110901 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in  
German 9 Apr 88 p 11

[Interview with Admiral Dieter Welershoff, inspector general of the Bundeswehr, by correspondent Kurt Kister—place and date not given]

[Excerpt] Kister: The treaty on intermediate-range missiles has not yet been ratified, and the discussion about a loss of strategic options connected with the treaty is continuing. What is your position on the discussion?

WELLERSHOFF: I think all of us are well advised to accept the INF treaty—even though we must clearly say that the treaty does not have only benefits. There is actually a loss of some important military options attributable to the treaty. That is particularly true in maintaining the threat to Soviet territory from Europe. Concerning security policy, the treaty has in fact some very important positive aspects. To me, the most significant is that the steadfastness of all governments of the NATO alliance was the crucial precondition to conclude the treaty. Concerning weapons policy, this is the first treaty in which the Soviet Union has agreed to asymmetric disarmament and comprehensive verification.

Kister: A study made by State Secretary Lothar Ruehl says that nuclear weapons on German soil are "irreplaceable" and must be modernized. Do you agree?

WELLERSHOFF: Maintaining an operational option is normal to me, as long as such an option is not basically left out of the political planning. The alliance's governments are currently asking themselves which systems are to represent the nuclear deterrence component in the future. That question is still open. The option will only remain viable if we leave open the opportunity to make a positive decision under certain conditions; we would lose the opportunity if we did not develop such systems. So, when it comes to modernization, we should distinguish between development and procurement. That is what we do in our national Bundeswehr planning. I mean, to maintain political options, development must take place today. That also encourages the other side to meet us halfway in the disarmament process. Nobody really wants unilateral disarmament through deterioration!

Kister: Does the inspector general think that modernizing the Lance short-range missile is necessary?

WELLERSHOFF: Experts have told me that the weapons system will remain useful until 1995. I think it is of little use and probably impossible to keep that system alive artificially. There is also the very clear declaration by the FRG chancellor that there shall be no denuclearization in Europe; the FRG Government is not striving for a third zero option. Based on those two facts, the political and the technical ones, I believe it is wise to base the nuclear components in Europe on qualities other than those the Lance has today: for example, a greater range—of course clearly below 500 km. That is within the INF treaty's framework. The number of the weapons with a range below 500 km might even be markedly reduced in such a case.

Kister: There are great political problems, in modernizing nuclear weapons in Europe. How do you assess the future of the Bundeswehr nuclear systems in general?

WELLERSHOFF: The FRG will continue to do its part in sharing the financial and political burdens. We cannot just break ranks and tell our alliance partners: "You do it now." A very important part of that is public acceptance of NATO strategy. To preserve peace, freedom, and justice, there is no acceptable alternative to NATO's goals: "military security plus detente" and the strategy of flexible response.

Kister: ...with nuclear weapons?

WELLERSHOFF: Yes, with nuclear weapons. The date 10 November 1988 will be very important. Not because Carnival will begin the day after, and not because my eldest son will have his birthday, but because on that day the longest period of peace in German history will have been achieved. I emphasize what the Federal president says: The peace-keeping effect of nuclear weapons has gained a moral quality of its own. Whoever thinks that is correct must also convince our compatriots of it. That is the political challenge that I see. It is difficult, but not impossible. The point is to express embarrassing facts with courage—for instance, that there is no life without risk. There is durable peace between people and nations only if any attack carries an intolerable risk for the attacker. The history of war is a history of the failure of purely conventional deterrence. I think that our compatriots are much more reasonable than many populists say.

Kister: Do you mean politicians when you say populists?

WELLERSHOFF: I mean all those who think they might, in arousing emotions or following them, express a real policy by doing so. The issues to be solved are so complex that feelings and wishes do not suffice for answers.

Kister: Regarding the problems of conventional arms control, the phrase "invasion capability of the Warsaw Pact" is often used. Why has such a phrase only been used in the political discussions lately?

WELLERSHOFF: The fact is not new at all. It describes the capability to make surprise attacks using conventional weapons while taking territory, following strategic goals. We have observed that capability in the Warsaw Pact for many years. The word "capability" implies being able to do it. It does not say that we anticipate such behavior by the other side here today. Doctrines and intentions can be changed with one stroke of the pen; capabilities need many years to be built up and exist for many years. That is what our future activities must be oriented to.

Kister: In the mid-nineties we will have a structural reform of the Bundeswehr. It will bring with it a reduction in the number of active soldiers. Is that not a form of unilateral reduction which the Warsaw Pact can lick its lips anticipating without anything in return?

WELLERSHOFF: That is a trend that seriously concerns me. However, our planning is such that we—in light of the demographic problems—chose an approach that need not necessarily lead to a gap in conventional defense capability. We really cannot have more than 456,000 active soldiers in the mid-nineties which our current planning dictates. It is a considerable challenge, but we will make much greater use of our potential of reservists. And we can, provided we receive sufficient money, make much better use of modern technology.

Kister: It sounds very cautious when you say that the new structure need not necessarily mean a gap in conventional defense capability. When would a gap occur?

WELLERSHOFF: I would see a gap if we were not in a position to draft sufficient active-duty soldiers; if we were not able to train the reservists sufficiently and adapt them to the defense structure; if we were unable to keep the Bundeswehr at a technologically modern level that is in line with the threat. All three depend on the acceptance of defense—and on money, to a considerable extent, of course. In that connection, I am particularly concerned that—while the defense budget is constant or even slightly down in terms of real figures—operational costs, including personnel costs, will expand compared with other sectors. That means we would not be able to keep the Bundeswehr modern.

Kister: So you will need increasing defense budgets for the next few years?

WELLERSHOFF: We should have extra money for what we need to finance our active duty and reserves plan. Currently there is the danger that such expenses will be placed within the existing defense budget.

Kister: The chancellor has promised that the Bundeswehr will get what it needs.

WELLERSHOFF: That is a question of definition. No doubt there are good intentions. It is true that we have several promises of that kind including a Cabinet decision of 16 December 1987. We will see when the 22nd finance plan is determined this summer. Until then I am full of hope and trust in what the government has promised us.

### **Defense Minister Calls on USSR To 'Match Words, Deeds'**

*LD111532 Hamburg DPA in German  
1434 GMT 11 Apr 88*

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (CDU) has accused the Soviet Union of constantly talking about disarmament while at the same time arming itself further without pause. "We would do well not to speculate about the intentions, motives, and aims of Gorbachev, but to stick to the facts," he said in Hamburg on Monday at a "Bundeswehr and Society Forum."

Woerner mentioned the building of new sea-based missiles, bombers, combat helicopters, and fighter aircraft, and the development of two nuclear intercontinental missiles and new submarines. He called on the Soviet Union "to end its policy of further arming and at long last to match words and deeds."

Regarding NATO, Woerner reaffirmed Bonn's call for a restructuring of the alliance's nuclear potential in an overall concept. "This would in no sense involve a compensation for the disarmed medium-range and cruise missiles and certainly not an evasion of the INF agreement."


Rather it is necessary "to reduce the minimum requirement of nuclear weapons of all levels." The German interest is aimed at a further reduction in the shorter range weapons in favor of weapons which could transfer the risk to the territory of a possible attacker.

Woerner described as a key problem for the future of the Bundeswehr the attraction of soldiering as a profession. This is determined by three factors: the esteem enjoyed in society, the climate and social conditions, and promotion prospects in the Armed Forces.

He named as among the necessary social conditions the continuation of efforts to reduce hours of service and better and more just compensation for additional work; also help for soldiers' families for transfers and relocation, better training for civilian professions for soldiers committing themselves to serve a certain term, and bonuses for signing on and reenlisting.

The one-day "Bundeswehr and Society Forum" was held by the WELT AM SONNTAG and is intended to become an annual event. Participants were officers, representatives from the political and economic sectors, and journalists.







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